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INTRODUCTION
Of the butchers and floorsmen, the beef-boners and trimmers, and all
those who used knives, you could scarcely find a person who had the
use of his thumb; time and time again the base of it had been slashed,
till it was a mere lump of flesh against which the man pressed the
knife to hold it. The hands of these men would be crisscrossed with
cuts, until you could no longer pretend to count them or to trace them.
They would have no nails, – they had worn them off pulling hides;
their knuckles were swollen so that their fingers spread out like a fan.1
In 1906, Upton Sinclair published the results of his undercover in-
vestigations in The Jungle, which exposed horrendous conditions faced
by employees in the meat-packing industry.2 This led to social outcry
and major reform.3 Undercover investigations provide an avenue to in-
form the public when businesses conduct unethical, hazardous, or unlaw-
1 UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 82 (Paul Negri & Joslyn T. Pine eds., Dover Thrift Editions
12th ed. 2001) (1906). The story is based on Sinclair’s undercover investigations within the Chicago
meatpacking industry in the 1900s, despite being a work of fiction.
2 SINCLAIR, supra note 1.
3 Following the release of The Jungle, the Meat and Inspection Act of 1906 and the Pure
Food and Drug Act of 1906 were enacted. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle: Muckraking the Meat-
Packing Industry, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-in-action/bria-24-1-b-
upton-sinclairs-the-jungle-muckraking-the-meat-packing-industry.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
2
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ful activities.4 The investigator’s right to access workplace settings is
indispensable to safeguard the public’s health and safety.5 Vulnerable
individuals, such as children and the elderly, are left unprotected without
the investigator’s access to the workplace.6 Today, eight states have en-
acted whistleblower7 silencing bills that criminalize and/or impose se-
vere civil penalties against individuals who, like Sinclair, conduct
undercover investigations to expose illegal and unethical practices.8 Two
of the state laws expand beyond food-processing facilities to target inves-
tigations within any work place, including childcare facilities and nursing
homes.9
These whistleblower silencing bills, also known as ‘ag-gag bills,’10
began to emerge after undercover investigations severely damaged the
image of factory farms.11 For example, undercover investigators yielded
footage of animal abuse: employees skinning alive day-old calves, grind-
ing-up male chicks, and forcing injured animals to their kill spot by use
of electric prods, fork lifts, and jabs to the eye.12 After learning about
these undercover investigations, 28 states attempted to enact ag-gag leg-
islation between 1990 and 2017.13
4 See Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Urging Reversal at 4, PETA,
Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), vacated, 737 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018),
https://www.rcfp.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/2017-08-11-peta-nc.pdf.
5 See id. at 5-9 (providing examples of disturbing practices that were exposed by undercover
journalists, for example, the whistleblower who uncovered a history of careless inspections prior to
the explosion of the oil rig Deepwater Horizon).
6 See id. at 11-12 (presenting the example of the 1991 three-month investigation of a private
nursing homes in Texas that uncovered disturbing recordings of the troubling treatment of the facil-
ity’s elderly residents).
7 A whistleblower is “an employee who turns against their superiors to bring [a] problem out
in the open.” Whistleblower, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
8 Current ag-gag laws exist in Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Missouri, Montana and Texas. Public Policy, What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?, ASPCA, https://www
.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/what-ag-gag-legislation (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (stat-
ing that ag-gag bills are designed to silence whistleblowers who reveal to the public the animal abuse
that is occurring on factory farms).
9 The Arkansas and North Carolina statutes broaden the application to any workplace setting.
Id.
10 Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals?, N.Y. TIMES, https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes
.com/2011/04/26/who-protects-the-animals/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) (coining the term “ag-gag”
to refer to legislation intended to silence investigators from exposing illegal and unethical practices
within farm factories). The author uses the term “whistleblower silencing bill” to reflect the modern
expansion of this legislation to hinder not only the investigations of farm factories, but of any busi-
ness or organization.
11 Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1195-97 (D. Utah 2017). A
farm factory is a large industrial facility that raises animals for food. Factory Farms, Farm Animals
Need Our Help, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/farm-animal-welfare (last visited
Feb. 23, 2019).
12 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1197.
13 ASPCA, supra note 8.
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The purpose of ag-gag legislation is to prevent the investigation of
questionable operational practices within factory farms.14 In the past,
these investigations resulted in boycotts, bankruptcy, and criminal
charges for farm factories and their owners.15 For example, former fed-
eral contractors for the National School Lunch Program,16 Hallmark
Meat Packing Company and Westland Meat Company Inc., settled for a
combined $652 million after an undercover investigation revealed a
video of the companies violating federal law by forcing cows, who were
too sick to stand, to their feet in order to pass inspection.17 The video18
went public in 2008 and led to the largest recall of beef in United States
(“U.S.”) history: 143 million pounds.19
Ag-gag laws vary from state-to-state.20 For example, an ag-gag pro-
vision might prohibit access of agriculture facilities under false pre-
tenses, misrepresentations on job applications, or video/audio recording
at the facility.21 Typically, these statutes criminalize the actions of under-
cover investigators who document and expose unethical practices within
agricultural facilities.22 The legislatures in 12 states have successfully
enacted ag-gag bills, though the courts have subsequently struck down
four of the laws as unconstitutional because they impermissibly restricted
First Amendment rights.23 Six of the active ag-gag laws impose criminal
14 See Our Opinion: Time’s Running Out for North Carolina’s Atrocious Ag-Gag Law, WIL-
SON TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019 9:01 PM), http://wilsontimes.com/stories/our-opinion-time-running-out-
for-nc-ag-gag,156820.
15 Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1197-98.
16 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Intervenes in Suit Against Former Beef Suppliers
to National School Lunch Program: Inhumane Treatment and Slaughter of Disabled, Non-Ambula-
tory Cattle at Issue (May 1, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-intervenes-suit-against-form
er-beef-suppliers-national-school-lunch-program.
17 Helena Bottemiller, Landmark Settlement Reached in Westland-Hallmark Meat Case,
FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/11/landmark-settle
ment-reached-in-westlandhallmark-meat-case/ (stating “Westland/Hallmark went out of business af-
ter the abuse footage–which showed “downer” cows (animals unable to walk) being dragged, vio-
lently prodded, and forklifted–caused national outrage”). ASPCA, supra note 8. At the time of this
incident the USDA prohibited the processing of meat from downer cows and a California law re-
quired that cows too sick to stand be humanely euthanized. 9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2007).
18 Videotape: Crimes of Hallmark Westland Meat Company (Downer Cows Abuse) (Vegan
Century Oct. 29, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y95vIdwM0Vs (showing the images
that sparked the controversy).
19 Bottemiller, supra note 17. Prior to this incident, only four states introduced ag-gag legisla-
tion from 1990 to 2011: Alabama, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota.
20 ASPCA, supra note 8.
21 See Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1198. The terms agriculture facility, agriculture business,
farms, and businesses are a few of the terms used within proposed state legislation to describe the
businesses targeted by undercover investigations, and thus protected by the whistleblower silencing
bills. ASPCA, supra note 8.
22 ASPCA, supra note 8.
23 Ag-gag laws imposing criminal penalties in Idaho, Iowa, Utah, and Wyoming were all
struck down as unconstitutional. ASPCA, supra note 8; Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Reynolds, 2019
4
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penalties; however, two laws—in the states of North Carolina and Ar-
kansas—utilize a new strategy that imposes severe civil penalties on em-
ployees who conduct undercover investigations at their workplace.24
North Carolina unsuccessfully attempted to pass ag-gag legislation
with criminal penalties in 2013 and 2014.25 In 2015, North Carolina en-
acted the Property Protection Act (“PPA”), which permits employers to
recover damages from an employee who captures video or data from
nonpublic areas of the workplace.26 There are two major differences be-
tween PPA and the traditional ag-gag statute.27 First, PPA does not
criminalize the act, but allows employers to recover severe civil penalties
from an employee who violated the statute.28 North Carolina was the first
state to impose civil penalties in an ag-gag statute.29 Consequently, there
is no judicial guidance on how standing30—a justiciability requirement—
applies in a First Amendment pre-enforcement challenge of an ag-gag
law that imposes severe civil penalties.31 Second, PPA is an ag-gag law
and a piece of general anti-whistleblower legislation that applies to all
employees in North Carolina regardless of the industry.32 This broad
drafting lessens the agricultural focus and impedes the ability of an em-
ployee in any industry to confront unethical treatment encountered on the
job.33
U.S. Dist. WL 140069 at *1 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 9, 2019) (stating that the Iowa ag-gag law was unconsti-
tutional because the false statements implicated by the statute were protected under the First Amend-
ment and the statute did not survive strict or intermediate scrutiny).
24 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2016) (imposing severe civil penalties of $5,000 a day for each
day the defendant acted in violation of the statute); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113 (2017) (imposing
severe civil penalties of $5,000 a day for each day the defendant acted in violation of the statute). A
$5,000 a day penalty is severe for an undercover investigator whose work will last weeks, months or
even years. CARMEN CUSACK, ANIMALS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 139 (Routledge 2017) (2015)
(“Long term [investigations] typically last around six weeks, but could . . . last for many years.”).
25 ASPCA, supra note 8.
26 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
27 See ASPCA, supra note 8.
28 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
29 See ASPCA, supra note 8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
30 Standing requires the plaintiff to establish an injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability to
bring a claim. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
31 In PETA v. Stein, the court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing because the relaxed
standing requirement for First Amendment claims applied to criminal statutes, but not civil statutes.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the
plaintiffs possessed Article III standing to challenge PPA on First Amendment free-speech grounds.
PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 129-31
(4th Cir. 2018).
32 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
33 See Dan Flynn, Activists Challenge NC’s New Ag-Gag Law in Federal Court, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/01/north-carolinas-new-ag-
gag-law-challenged-in-federal-court/.
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In May 2017, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc.
(“PETA”) brought a pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge of
PPA, which the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Car-
olina dismissed because the plaintiffs did not meet the standing require-
ment.34 While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded the decision holding that the plaintiffs proved an actual
injury,35 the court did not address how the standing requirement would
apply to a challenge of PPA if the plaintiffs, lacking an actual injury,
claimed a certainly impending injury.36 Additionally, the decision re-
mains unpublished and therefore lacks precedent.37 The uncertainty sur-
rounding the application of the standing requirement for statutes like
PPA might encourage other states to draft similar bills,38 further jeopard-
izing the rights of workplace whistleblowers.
Arkansas passed Act 606 in March 2017.39 The legislation permits
employers to seek severe civil penalties—up to $5,000 a day—against
employees who intentionally uncover wrongdoing in the workplace.40
The Arkansas law, like North Carolina’s PPA, does not solely pertain to
employees of agricultural businesses, but also applies to employees
within any Arkansas business.41 Additionally, Arkansas broadened the
scope of the act so that it applies to any non-employee who “knowingly
gains access to a nonpublic area . . . and engages in an act that exceeds
the person’s authority.”42
The North Carolina and Arkansas laws are both examples of
whistleblower silencing bills that have been disguised as property-protec-
34 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 386 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2018).
35 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that “Plaintiffs alleged injury for
standing purposes is that they have refrained from carrying out their planned investigations based on
their reasonable and well-founded fear that they will be subjected to significant exemplary damages
under the Act if they move forward at all.” PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C.
2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 130 (4th Cir. 2018).
36 Id. at 131.
37 When a court determines that a decision is without precedent, the court has expressed
concern that it might be acting outside the law or inconsistently with established law. Michael Kagan
et al., Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO L.J. 683, 684 (2018), https://
georgetownlawjournal.org/articles/264/invisible-adjudication-u-s-courts/pdf. The Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 mandates the permissibility of the citation of unpublished, nonprecedential
opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals, thus, PETA v. Stein, an unpublished decision, is available in
the Federal Appendix. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1; PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 737 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018).
38 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113. Arkansas Act 606 has provisions like PPA and it was
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tion legislation.43 PPA permits “recovery of damages for exceeding the
scope of authorized access to property.”44 Act 606 is a civil cause of
action for unauthorized access to property.45 Laws that restrict actions
based on their communicative power raise considerable constitutional is-
sues,46 despite the importance of property protection.47 With the enact-
ment of whistleblower silencing bills, like PPA and Act 606, the
constitutional First Amendment concerns extend beyond farm factories
and jeopardize every employee’s right to uncover workplace wrongdo-
ing.48 When there is a risk that statutory provisions may chill free speech,
judicial review is essential to ensure First Amendment rights are pro-
tected.49 This Comment analyzes the court’s application of the standing
doctrine in PETA v. Stein50 to demonstrate that the dismissal of a chal-
lenge to a whistleblower silencing statute because the plaintiff lacked
standing is detrimental to First Amendment rights. This Comment argues
that a relaxed standing requirement must be applied to future pre-en-
forcement challenges of legislation that aims to silence whistleblowers,
and therefore chills First Amendment rights.
Part I examines the court’s relaxed application of the standing re-
quirement to criminal statutes that chill First Amendment rights. Part II
argues for a relaxed application of the standing requirement to
whistleblower silencing statutes, both criminal and civil, that chill First
Amendment rights. Finally, Part III discusses the implication of the un-
43 ASPCA, supra note 8.
44 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
45 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
46 See Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1213 (“Utah undoubtedly has an interest in addressing
perceived threats to the state agricultural industry, and as history shows, it has a variety of constitu-
tionally permissible tools at its disposal to do so. Suppressing broad swaths of protected speech
without justification, however, is not one of them.”).
47
“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands
in an owner’s bundle of property rights.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S.
419, 435 (1982).
48 Press Release: ALDF, Coalition Sues North Carolina over Constitutionality of ‘Anti-Sun-
shine’ Law (Jan. 13, 2016), https://aldf.org/article/coalition-sues-north-carolina-over-constitutional-
ity-of-anti-sunshine-law/ (“North Carolina’s version is written so broadly that it would also ban
undercover investigations of all private entities, including nursing homes and daycare centers. The
North Carolina law threatens to silence conscientious employees who witness and wish to report
wrongdoing.”).
49
“When contesting the constitutionality of a criminal statute, ‘it is not necessary that [the
plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge [the] statute
that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.’” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U. S.
289, 298 (1979) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)).
50 PETA brought the first pre-enforcement challenge of North Carolina’s Property Protection
Act. PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 371 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 129-
30 (4th Cir. 2018).
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published PETA v. Stein decision and the likelihood of an increase in
civil statutes silencing workplace whistleblowers.
I. BACKGROUND
To appreciate the significance of PPA and Act 606, it is first neces-
sary to understand whistleblowers’ rights to access and expose work-
place wrongdoing. Moreover, it is valuable to recognize the purpose of
special interest groups and their potential influence on the design of new
legislation. A comparison of PPA and Act 606 to traditional ag-gag laws
highlights the potential impact on all workplace whistleblowers. Further-
more, PPA and Act 606 call attention to the uncertainty of the standing
application in challenges to civil statutes threatening First Amendment
rights.
A. THE EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO UNCOVER WRONGDOING IN THE
WORKPLACE
In November 2018, mother Kindsie watched a video that showed her
four-year-old son’s childcare teacher straddling her son on the floor, re-
peatedly slapping and pinching him.51 Kindsie’s son came home with
welts and bruises.52 After a teacher at the center quietly hinted to the
concerned mother that there was trouble, Kindsie demanded to see the
security cameras which uncovered the documented abuse of her son.53
Kindsie believed that the center attempted to cover up the abuse and, if
not for an employee at the center speaking up, the abuse would remain
undiscovered.54 The state charged the teacher with felony child abuse.55
The vulnerable individuals in society, such as young children and
the elderly, depend on employees who witness abuse, wrongdoing, or
illegal conduct to speak out.56 Fortunately, employees have constitutional
protections to ensure their ability to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in
the workplace.57 In addition, there are currently 22 federal laws that con-
tain provisions protecting employees from retaliation for reporting the
51 J.D. Miles, North Texas Daycare Worker Charged with Child Abuse, CBS DFN (Nov. 19,
2018, 5:10 PM), https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2018/11/19/north-texas-daycare-worker-charged-child-
abuse/.




56 See id. 
57 The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits Congress from passing
laws that abridge an individual’s freedom of speech. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8
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misconduct of their employer.58 For example, the Affordable Care Act,
the Clean Air Act, and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act
all include provisions protecting whistleblowers from “adverse action,”
such as firing, intimidation, harassment, or reduction in pay or hours.59
However, each whistleblower provision has specific requirements, de-
pending on the federal law.60 Thus, it may be complicated to determine
which federal law provides the whistleblower with protection. Each fed-
eral whistleblower provision covers a specific category of employee, has
specific actions that violate the provision, and has short and varying
deadlines for filing an action.61
In addition, all states have some form of statutory safeguard for
whistleblowers, and like federal protections, the application and the ex-
tent to which these statutes shield whistleblowers varies by state.62 For
example, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when
public employees make a statement within the duties of their job they are
not speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.63 The Court
found that a district attorney’s memorandum was a work-related task and
58 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Whistleblower Protection Program, Statutes, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., https://www.whistleblowers.gov/statutes (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act includes a provision, section
11(c), that “provides in general that no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against
any employee because the employee has: (a) Filed any complaint under or related to the Act; (b)
Instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to the Act; (c) Testified or is
about to testify in any proceeding under the Act or related to the Act; or (d) Exercised on his own
behalf or on behalf of others any right afforded by the Act.” 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
59 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 58; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Whistleblower Protection
Program, Protection from Workplace Retaliations, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.whistleblowers.gov/know_your_rights (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
60 U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Admin. Directorate of Whistleblower
Protection Programs (DWPP) Whistleblower Statutes Desk Aid, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
ADMIN., https://www.whistleblowers.gov/whistleblower_acts-desk_reference (last visited Feb. 23,
2019).
61 Id. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act applies only to the private sector, per-
mits thirty days to file and thirty days to complete, and protects employees from retaliation for
reporting possible violations relating to industrial chemicals. 15 U.S.C. § 2622.
62 Whistleblower Protection Laws, Deputizing Workers to Identify and Report Hazards, CPR,
http://www.progressivereform.org/WorkerWhistleblower.cfm (last visited Feb. 11, 2019). For exam-
ple, a North Carolina whistleblower statute states that “[i]t is the policy of this State that State
employees shall have a duty to report verbally or in writing to their supervisor, department head, or
other appropriate authority, evidence of activity by a State agency or State employee constituting
any of the following: (1) A violation of State or federal law, rule or regulation; (2) Fraud; (3)
Misappropriation of State resources; (4) Substantial and specific danger to the public health and
safety; (5) Gross mismanagement, a gross waste of monies, or gross abuse of authority; (b) Further,
it is the policy of this State that State employees be free of intimidation or harassment when report-
ing to public bodies about matters of public concern, including offering testimony to or testifying
before appropriate legislative panels.” The statute does not provide protections to non-state employ-
ees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 126-84(a) (2018).
63 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
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was not protected speech.64 Garcetti assumed that state whistleblower
laws provide protection to employees who uncover wrongdoing.65 In
Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, the Connecticut Supreme Court de-
termined the amount of protection that Connecticut workers receive,66
but in most states it is unclear.67 Employees depend on legislatures to
enact statutes that protect their right to uncover wrongdoing because em-
ployees remain vulnerable to retaliation for whistleblower conduct.
B. THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS
State legislators, as part of their oath, are responsible for upholding
their state’s constitution and the U.S. Constitution.68 There is an inherent
conflict between their duty to uphold the law and the influence of special
interest groups, which might be contrary to the legislatures’ duty to their
constituents.69 An inherent danger in legislative drafting is that the law
may be influenced by special interest groups,70 such as agricultural and
food special interest groups.71 For example, a legislator may help serve a
special interest group by drafting a bill to avoid litigation that would
64 Id. at 410, 426.
65
“The dictates of sound judgment are reinforced by the powerful network of legislative
enactments-such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes-available to those who seek to
expose wrongdoing.” Id. at 425.
66 Trusz v. UBS Realty Investors, LLC, 319 Conn. 175, 215-17 (2015) (holding that the state
constitution protects employee speech related to official duties in a public workplace from employer
discipline only if it involves a “comment on official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action,
other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety,” and that the protections extend to private
employees).
67 Robert Joyce, Understanding the Limitations of North Carolina’s Whistleblower Protection
Act, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T: COATES’ CANONS: NC LOC. GOV’T LAW (July 8, 2010), https://
canons.sog.unc.edu/understanding-the-limitations-of-north-carolinas-whistleblower-protection-act/
(providing an example of state whistleblower limitations for government employees).
68
“I, (name), do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of Ohio, will administer justice without respect to persons, and will faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all of the duties incumbent upon me as (name of office) according
to the best of my ability and understanding. [This I do as I shall answer unto God.]” OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3.23 (West 2007).
69 See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (demonstrating
the conflict regarding the protection of the constitutional freedom of association and addressing
concerns of legislative capture by special interest groups).
70 See Chris Micheli, How Interest Groups Influence Policymaking, CAL. LAWMAKING
(March 12, 2018), https://www.capimpactca.com/2018/03/interest-groups-influence-policymaking/.
A special interest group is a group of individuals with shared interests working together to advance
their cause. Id.
71 Some of the powerful meat-lobbying organizations are the American Meat Institute, the
National Meat Association, and the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association. Steve Johnson, The
Politics of Meat, FRONTLINE, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/meat/politics/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2019).
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threaten the objectives of the group.72 One way to reduce the likelihood
of a lawsuit is to complicate the path to judicial review for potential
challengers.73 If a court cannot hear a case, there can be no challenge to
the statute’s validity. The justiciability doctrines, namely standing, serve
to limit the role of the courts in resolving public disputes and set forth
specific requirements that must be met before a litigant may bring an
action in federal court.74 Thus, drafting legislation in a certain way to
frustrate a plaintiff’s path to judicial review may further the goals of
special interest groups.
Another tactic used to achieve the goals of special interest groups,
by evading judicial review, is to draft a statute that includes civil penal-
ties as opposed to criminal liability.75 Individuals facing civil penalties
do not receive the same constitutional protections secured for criminal
litigants by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Consti-
tution.76 The Amendments apply to government action, and not private,
civil action.77 This makes judicial review of civil statutes more diffi-
cult.78 In the 1980s, the strategy of including civil penalties in legislation
resulted in an unsuccessful attack on the pornography industry.79 Legis-
lative efforts attempted to slow down the spread of the pornography in-
dustry by granting individuals a means of recovery for the harm they
experienced as a result of pornography.80 The anti-pornography statutes
72 See Micheli, supra note 70.
73 Plaintiffs must satisfy the justiciability requirements, standing, ripeness, mootness and po-
litical question, to bring a claim. See Bombero v. Bombero, 160 Conn. App. 118, 135 (2015). Thus,
a statute may be drafted in a way that complicates the plaintiff’s ability to satisfying the
requirements.
74 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1978).
75 See Am. Book Sellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 333-34 (1985) (holding that an
Indianapolis statute that permitted civil penalties to individuals emotionally injured by pornography
was unconstitutional based on First Amendment free-speech rights).
76 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, VI.
77 Id.
78 See PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 383-84 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F.
App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating that while courts routinely apply a relaxed standing requirement
to First Amendment challenges of criminal statutes, the application of the relaxed standing require-
ment to civil statutes is unclear).
79 See Am. Book Sellers, 771 F.2d 323. See ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKIN-
NON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 24-30 (1985), https://
www.feministes-radicales.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Catharine-A.-MacKinnon-Andrea-Dwor
kin-Pornography-and-Civil-Rights-A-New-Day-for-Women%E2%80%99s-Equality-1988.pdf (out-
lining the movement to attack pornography, not by criminalizing the distribution and production of
pornography, but by permitting severe civil penalties to individuals emotionally injured by
pornography).
80 See Am. Book Sellers, 771 F.2d at 324-25; see also DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note
79.
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were ultimately determined to unconstitutionally infringe on First
Amendment rights.81
Furthermore, in the 1990s, in opposition to Roe v. Wade, states un-
successfully attempted to criminalize abortion.82 Consequently, Louisi-
ana enacted a statute to deter physicians from performing abortions by
imposing civil liability for damages incurred by patients during abor-
tions.83 This tactic also raised constitutional concerns.84 In Okpaloby v.
Foster, the district court stated that the statute permitting tort liability
against abortion providers “place[d] an unconstitutional undue burden on
a woman’s right to abortion.”85 On rehearing en banc, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the standing requirement.86
Therefore, other states viewed this as a successful approach, which led to
the enactment of similar statutes to deter physicians in their states from
performing abortions.87
The above tactics have gained traction again with PPA as tools to
achieve special interests.88 The application of severe civil penalties in
place of criminal prosecution may increase the possibility that PPA, and
statutes alike, will evade review.89
81 See Am. Book Sellers, 771 F 2d. at 332-334.
82 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Abortion was banned except when necessary to save
the pregnant woman’s life or in limited cases of rape and incest. LA. STAT. ANN. §14:87 (1991),
invalidated by Sojourner v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 31 (5th Cir. 1992).
83 LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2800.12(A) (2006). The Liability for Termination of Pregnancy Act
states that “any person who performs an abortion is liable to the mother of the unborn child for any
damages occasioned or precipitated by the abortion.”
84 See Okpaloby v. Foster, 244 F.3d at 409-10 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing the district court’s
opinion that statutes permitting tort liability for abortion providers “places an unconstitutional undue
burden on a woman’s right to abortion”).
85 See id. at 428-29 (discussing a Louisiana statute that allegedly forced physicians to stop
performing abortions because of possible exposure to civil damage claims, thus achieving the goal of
eliminating abortions, in which the court ultimately determined the plaintiffs had no case or
controversy).
86 See id. at 428-29 (holding by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that the
plaintiffs did satisfy the standing requirement).
87 See Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153-54, 1157 (10th Cir. 2005) (further
demonstrating the constitutional concerns regarding statutes imposing civil penalties to deter acts,
and the difficulty for plaintiffs to prove standing in such cases).
88 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
89 See id.; see also PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 386 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d,
737 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that the plaintiffs did not meet the standing requirement,
which was reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; however, the
unpublished decision lacks precedent).
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C. WHISTLEBLOWER SILENCING BILLS THAT IMPOSE SEVERE CIVIL
PENALTIES
The purpose of traditional ag-gag laws is to dissuade undercover
investigators from documenting disturbing practices occurring at farm
factories,90 while modern whistleblower silencing laws expand the re-
striction to any workplace setting.91 Expanding the scope of these stat-
utes to include all employees increases the likelihood that employees will
choose not to expose the mistreatment of vulnerable individuals for fear
of severe civil penalties.
1. North Carolina’s Property Protection Act, the New Ag-Gag Law
PPA, which is a civil—not criminal—statute, permits damages of up
to $5,000 a day for each day that an employee violates any of PPA’s
provisions.92 An employee violates PPA if the employee “intentionally
gains access to the nonpublic areas93 of [the employer’s] premises and
engages in an act that exceeds the person’s authority to enter those ar-
eas.”94 Consequently, this may cause an employee engaged in an under-
cover investigation at work to be liable for up to $450,000 in damages if
they carried out the investigation for three months.95 Even an employee
90 Ag-Gag Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/issue/ag-gag/ (last visited Mar.
1, 2019).
91 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
92 Id.
93
“For the purposes of this section, ‘nonpublic areas’ shall mean those areas not accessible to
or not intended to be accessed by the general public.” Id.
94
“For the purposes of this section, an act that exceeds a person’s authority to enter the
nonpublic areas of another’s premises is any of the following: (1) An employee who enters the
nonpublic areas of an employer’s premises for a reason other than a bona fide intent of seeking or
holding employment or doing business with the employer and thereafter without authorization cap-
tures or removes the employer’s data, paper, records, or any other documents and uses the informa-
tion to breach the person’s duty of loyalty to the employer. (2) An employee who intentionally enters
the nonpublic areas of an employer’s premises for a reason other than a bona fide intent of seeking
or holding employment or doing business with the employer and thereafter without authorization
records images or sound occurring within an employer’s premises and uses the recording to breach
the person’s duty of loyalty to the employer. (3) Knowingly or intentionally placing on the em-
ployer’s premises an unattended camera or electronic surveillance device and using that device to
record images or data. (4) Conspiring in organized retail theft, as defined in Article 16A of Chapter
14 of the General Statutes. (5) An act that substantially interferes with the ownership or possession
of real property.” Id.
95
“[The] length of the investigation will be determined by a number of factors.” EUGENE
FERRARO, UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS FOR THE WORKPLACE 30 (Elsevier Science 2000) (stating
an investigation can take weeks or months). An undercover investigator facing civil penalties under
PPA for a three-month investigation, could owe up to $450,000, or $5,000 for each day. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
13
Cooley: Gagged by Big Ag: Whistleblower Silencing Bills
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
104 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
with a strong desire to uncover the most disturbing behavior might re-
consider, self-censor their speech, and leave the behavior uncovered.
The district court in PETA v. Stein dismissed the First Amendment
pre-enforcement challenge of PPA because PETA did not meet the stand-
ing requirement.96 The court implied that the pre-enforcement challenge
would have been reviewable by applying a relaxed standing standard if
PPA was a criminal statute.97 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit later reversed and remanded the decision, holding that the plain-
tiffs satisfied standing by proving an actual injury.98 The decision re-
mains unpublished.99 Therefore, a plaintiff raising a pre-enforcement
challenge to similar whistleblower silencing laws will likely face a simi-
lar battle in satisfying the standing requirement.100
2. Arkansas’s Act 606 Modeled After the Property Protection Act
Less than two years after the enactment of PPA, Arkansas passed a
nearly identical ag-gag law, Act 606.101 The Act imposes civil penalties
on any employee that exceeds his or her authority to enter into a nonpub-
lic area and damages the employer by capturing or removing documents
or recording images or sounds, placing a camera, conspiring in  organ-
ized theft of employer belongings, or committing an act that substantially
interferes with ownership of the property.102 In addition, employees can
be held liable if they knowingly assist or direct another employee to vio-
late the statute.103
There are several differences between PPA and Act 606.104 Al-
though Act 606 broadened its scope of applicability compared to PPA by
applying liability to employees and non-employees alike, Arkansas has
reduced the number of work settings that Act 606 applies to.105 First, Act
606 applies to anyone who “knowingly gains access to a nonpublic area
96 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 386-87 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x
122 (4th Cir. 2018).
97 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2018).
98 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 130-
31 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding the plaintiffs alleged a well-founded fear of injury).
99 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122 (4th
Cir. 2018).
100 The appropriate application of the standing doctrine to whistleblower silencing bills im-
posing severe civil penalties is unclear. See PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C.
2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018).
101 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
105 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
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of a commercial property” and commits one of the acts noted above;
whereas PPA only applies to employees.106 Second, there are additional
restrictions to Act 606’s application that are not present in PPA’s provi-
sions.107 Act 606 does not apply if the employer-at-issue is any of the
following: a state agency, a public college or university, a police officer
engaged in an investigation of commercial property, or a healthcare or
medical services provider.108 Arkansas acted swiftly to pass an ag-gag
law mirroring North Carolina’s PPA.109 Other states may follow North
Carolina’s lead and pass anti-whistleblower legislation if PPA is not
struck down as an unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.110
D. THE APPLICATION OF THE STANDING REQUIREMENT TO FIRST
AMENDMENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS
The purpose of the standing doctrine is to safeguard the balance of
power between the three branches of government, recognizing that judi-
cial power can “[p]rofoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property of
those to whom it extends.”111 Merely alleging that a statute is unconstitu-
tional does not guarantee judicial standing because advisory opinions are
not permitted by the Constitution.112 The standing requirement ensures
that the plaintiff has the right to bring a legal claim and also safeguards
the defendant from an insufficient claim.113 The judiciary has overseen
the evolution of the standing doctrine, which ensures that before a case




109 PPA went into effect on January 1, 2016 and Act 606 was passed in March 2017, only 14
months later. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
110 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
111 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
112 An advisory opinion is mere statutory interpretation without review of an actual contro-
versy and violates the “case and controversy” requirement of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2; see Howell v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 143 S.W.3d 416, 440-41 (Tex. App.—Austin
2004, pet. denied). “The Court has frequently called attention to the ‘great gravity and delicacy’ of
its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress; and has restricted exercise of this
function by rigid insistence that the jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases and con-
troversies; and that they have no power to give advisory opinions.” Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-46 (1936).
113 The standing test ensures that the plaintiff has “such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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the injury was caused by the conduct of the defendant, and (3) the judi-
cial process can remedy the injury.114 Although constitutional review
should be avoided whenever possible,115 the threat to free speech carries
a societal interest that makes judicial review essential.116 In this context,
without constitutional review of state statutes that threaten the First
Amendment protections of whistleblowers, unethical behavior in the
workplace may remain undiscovered.
A chilling effect occurs when an action has the indirect effect of
dissuading speakers from exercising their First Amendment rights.117
Penalties that deter action can include criminal and civil actions, or loss
of state benefits or privacy.118 An individual’s chilled speech may satisfy
the standing requirement.119 The concrete injury requirement is met
when a statute forces individuals to change their conduct to avoid liabil-
ity.120 In cases regarding chilled speech, the traditional requirements that
the injury be concrete and particularized are relaxed to permit attenuated
claims.121 This relaxed standing requirement is an important protection
that may prevent states from overreaching and enacting unconstitutional
114 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). According to Lujan, to meet the
standing requirements, first, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact which is “concrete and
particularized” (citing Seldin, 422 U.S. at 508) and “real and immediate,” not “conjectural” or “hy-
pothetical.” Id. at 560 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Second,
standing requires that the conduct caused the injury, thus, the injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court.” Id. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426
U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). Third, it must be “likely,” not merely “speculative,” that the injury will be
“redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
115
“The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdic-
tion, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision.” Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-48 (explaining the safeguards
that the Court has implemented to ensure its review of constitutional questions is limited).
116 See Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 785-87 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing the relaxed
application of the standing doctrine in First Amendment challenges “to avoid the chilling effect of
sweeping restrictions”).
117
“Where . . . a statute imposes a direct restriction on protected First Amendment activity,
and where the defect in the statute is that the means chosen to accomplish the State’s objectives are
too imprecise, so that in all its applications the statute creates an unnecessary risk of chilling free
speech, the statute is properly subject to facial attack.” Sec’y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467
U.S. 947, 967 (1984).
118 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (imposing civil penalties); see IDAHO CODE § 18-7042 (im-
posing criminal penalties).
119 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (“If the injury is
certainly impending that is enough.” (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia 262 U.S. 553, 593
(1923))).
120 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 475 (1987) (“[T]he need to take such affirmative steps to
avoid the risk of harm . . . constitutes a cognizable injury . . . .”).
121
“[W]here a First Amendment challenge could be brought . . . there is a possibility that,
rather than risk . . . challenging the statute, [one] will refrain from engaging further in the protected
activity. Society as a whole then would be the loser. Thus, when there is a danger of chilling free
speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be avoided whenever possible may be out-
16
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anti-whistleblower laws by increasing the likelihood that such action by
the states will undergo judicial review.122
The plaintiff satisfies the injury requirement in criminal litigation by
a “credible threat” if a recently enacted statute facially restricts expres-
sive activity.123 However, to meet this exception, the plaintiff must prove
that the threat is not “imaginary or wholly speculative.”124 The reasoning
for the exception is that an individual should not have to undergo crimi-
nal prosecution to seek relief.125 Considering the differences between
criminal and civil proceedings, the application of a relaxed standing re-
quirement for civil plaintiffs is not well established.126
II. THE NEED FOR A RELAXED APPLICATION OF THE STANDING
REQUIREMENT TO CHILLING CIVIL STATUTES
The liberty interest of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees citizens certain protections against actions of
state governments, including the rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment of the Constitution.127 States have a responsibility to act in a way
that protects First Amendment rights.128 However, if a state drafts a stat-
ute that infringes on these protections, judicial review is the most logical
vehicle to address these concerns.129 The District Court  in PETA v. Stein
dismissed a pre-enforcement challenge of PPA even though it acknowl-
edged the possibility for the statute to chill First Amendment rights.130
This sends a disquieting message that suggests the judiciary will not pro-
tect constitutional rights even when those very rights are threatened by
governmental acts.
weighed by society’s interest in having the statute challenged.” Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at
956.
122 See PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378-81 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F.
App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018).
123 N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F. 3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996).
124 Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302.
125 Id. (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)).
126 For example, a few differences between criminal and civil proceedings include punish-
ment, standard of proof, and trial by jury. Criminal and Civil Justice, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME, http://victimsofcrime.org/media/reporting-on-child-sexual-abuse/criminal-and-civil-justice
(last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
127 James W. Ely, Jr., Due Process Clause, HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONST., http://www.heri
tage.org/constitution/#!/amendments/14/essays/170/due-process-clause (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
128 Alan Rosenthal, Beyond the Intuition that Says “I Know One When I See One,” How do
You Go About Measuring the Effectiveness of Any Given Legislature?, STATE LEGISLATURES MAG.
(July/Aug. 1999), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/the-good-legislature.aspx.
129 Id.
130 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 376 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he court is constrained from reaching the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, notwith-
standing the serious First Amendment issues at stake.”).
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A. THE FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHILLING EFFECT OF CIVIL
STATUTES
The relaxed standing requirement, which permits pre-enforcement
challenges to criminal statutes that chill free speech, should also apply to
civil statutes that substantially chill First Amendment rights. If a statute
causes a speaker to self-censor his protected speech, then the individual
has been harmed.131 If a civil statute chills free speech by permitting
severe penalties against an individual, the statute’s effect is like a crimi-
nal statute, thus the relaxed standard should apply.
1. A “Certainly Impending” Injury: Self-Censorship is Sufficient
Harm
A concrete injury is one of the three standing requirements, but a
fear of future injury can satisfy the requirement if the threatened injury is
“certainly impending.”132 “Certainly impending” means that there is a
substantial risk that the harm will occur.133 Society’s interest in protect-
ing free speech outweighs other interests, such as the courts’ interest in
applying judicial avoidance principles in determining whether a case has
standing.134 In First Amendment cases, the injury requirement is met if
an individual self-censors the right to free speech.135 Therefore, the in-
jury is that the speech was thwarted because the speech has not occurred
and may never occur.136
PPA discourages undercover investigators from working to uncover
unethical behavior in North Carolina businesses by threatening severe
civil penalties.137 The former governor of North Carolina, Pat McCrory,
vetoed PPA because he was “concerned that subjecting employees to po-
tential civil penalties would create an environment that discourages em-
ployees from reporting illegal activities.”138 The PETA court
acknowledged that PPA raises a legitimate First Amendment concern.139
The chilling of First Amendment rights, which PPA and similar
131 Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 956.
132 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S., 568 U.S. 398, 409-10 (2013).
133 Id. at 409.
134 Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 956.
135 Id. at 967-68.
136 Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2006).
137 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
138 Mark Binker & Laura Leslie, Lawmakers Override McCrory Veto on Controversial ‘Ag-
Gag’ Bill, WRAL (June 3, 2015), http://www.wral.com/lawmakers-override-mccrory-veto-on-con
troversial-private-property-bill/14687952/.
139 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 376 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2018).
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whistleblower bills cause, is significant enough to support the consistent
application of a relaxed standing requirement—generally only applicable
to criminal statutes—to ensure the judicial review of potentially uncon-
stitutional legislation.140 While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that PETA satisfied the standing requirement, the analysis
was pertaining to an actual injury and did not address the standing appli-
cation in a “certainly impending” injury.141
2. The Severe Civil Penalty: Remedial or Punitive?
A statute like PPA that imposes severe civil penalties—punitive
fines—on142 individuals who exercise their free speech rights warrants
constitutional protections as applied to criminal statutes.143 In U.S. v.
Halper, the Court, in determining whether a civil penalty constituted
punishment, held that punishment “cuts across the division” between
criminal and civil law.144 A medical service provider was convicted
under the False Claims Act, which permitted a $2,000 fine for each of
the 65 claims the medical provider violated under the Act, totaling over
$130,000.145 Civil action to recover penalties is “punitive in character,”
and resembles criminal penalties because the wrongdoer is punished.146
After Halper, courts “look to [1] the purpose of the civil action and [2]
the extent to which it is designed [to] punish[ ] or . . . reimburse[ ] the
government’s expenses.”147 If a civil statute imposing severe civil penal-
140 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs satisfied the
standing requirement, but the court did not address the relaxed application of the standing require-
ment to civil statutes. PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F.
App’x 122, 131 (4th Cir. 2018).
141 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 131
(4th Cir. 2018). The unpublished decision lacks precedent.
142 A remedial fine compensates for actual or anticipated losses; a punitive fine compensates
higher than reasonable for remedial purposes. Vikram Omar & David Reis, Are Large Civil Fines
For Minor Violations Unconstitutional? Applying Proportionality Standards Outside the Punitive
Damages Context, FINDLAW (June 11, 2004), https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/are-
large-civil-fines-for-minor-violations-unconstitutional.html.
143 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 442 (1989) (discussing whether a civil penalty
is equivalent to punishment and like a criminal penalty, the Court stated that case law did “not
foreclose the possibility that in a particular case a civil penalty . . . may be so extreme and so
divorced from the Government’s damages and expenses as to constitute punishment”).
144 The terms “criminal” and “civil” are insignificant because “civil proceedings may advance
punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be
served by criminal penalties.” Id. at 447-48.
145 Id. at 437-38.
146 United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1931).
147 Eric Anielak, Double Jeopardy: Protection Against Multiple Punishments, 61 MO. L.
REV. 169, 175-76 (1996), http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/12.
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ties was drafted to punish actors, then the relaxed standing doctrine
should apply.148
PPA’s severe civil penalty of $5,000 a day for each PPA violation
can easily lead to enormous penalties for those who seek to uncover
wrongdoing at their workplace.149 Penalties could reach $25,000 after
only one week on the job, $50,000 in just two weeks, and over $200,000
after just a few months of employment.150 The first question, whether the
legislature intended to label PPA as civil or criminal, can be determined
by reviewing a history of ag-gag legislation.151 Since 1990, 28 states
have introduced numerous statutes criminalizing activities related to the
documentation of conditions within agricultural businesses.152 PPA, like
traditional ag-gag statutes, threatens individuals who wish to uncover the
disturbing practices of agricultural businesses.153 Although PPA implies
a criminal intent, legislatures drafted PPA as a civil statute, perhaps to
avoid the attention of whistleblowers.154 PPA has the same intent as
every other ag-gag criminal statute, but the legislature intentionally
drafted it as a civil statute to benefit the special interests of North Caro-
lina’s agricultural businesses.155 Thus, the same standing requirement
should be applied to PPA as would be applied to ag-gag laws.156
Regarding the second consideration, PPA permits severe civil penal-
ties—punitive damages—thus, the penalty is comparable to criminal
punishment.157 PPA is equivalent to a criminal statute not just because of
148
“[C]riminal prosecutions masquerading in the guise of civil penalties will not be tolerated;
the alleged offender in a civil penalty case should receive the same protections afforded a defendant
in a criminal case.” Jonathan Charney, Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil
Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 482 (1974), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol59/
iss3/5.
149 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2 (permitting fines up to $5,000 a day for every day an individ-
ual violates PPA).
150 See id.
151 ASPCA, supra note 8.
152 ASPCA, supra note 8.
153 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2; ASPCA, supra note 8.
154 See Our Opinion: Time’s Running Out for North Carolina’s Atrocious Ag-Gag Law,
supra note 14 (stating “while our state hasn’t criminalized undercover investigations, it uses the
threat of steep fines to deter would-be whistleblowers” and “ag-gag laws are plainly intended to stop
undercover investigations that expose abuse and embarrass factory farms”).
155 See id. (“Animal welfare groups often use secretly recorded video of poultry and livestock
abuse to make their case for stricter farm regulations and food boycotts. That frightens farmers, who
use their lobbying muscle to preempt the threat to their business. But the undercover operatives often
uncover crimes, and without the evidence they gather, those crimes would go unpunished.”). North
Carolina is the second-largest hog producer in the U.S., totaling approximately $2.9 billion in sales.
2012 Ranking of Market Value of Ag Products Sold: North Carolina, USDA CENSUS OF AGRIC.,
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2012/Online_Resources/Rankings_of_Market_
Value/North_Carolina/index.php (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
156 See ASPCA, supra note 8.
157 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
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the amount of damages—$5,000 a day—but also because of the broad
application of violations applicable under the Act’s provisions.158 The
penalty not only applies to employees who violate the statute, but also
applies to any individual who “directs, assists, compensates, or induces”
another person to violate PPA.159 PPA was not enacted to compensate
employers for losses due to undercover investigations.160 Although fines
of $250,000 or more are extreme, the recovery would not remedy the
losses that businesses incur after wrongdoing is exposed: likely millions
of dollars.161 Hence, the goal of PPA is to punish whistleblowers, not to
reimburse employers for injury caused by whistleblowers. When willing
speakers chill their own speech due to fear of severe civil penalties, the
statute punishes the speaker and thereby indicates a criminal statutory
purpose.
B. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT STATE ACTION
Only a government actor can chill First Amendment rights.162 Some
legislatures attempt to disguise state action as a private action so that a
relaxed standing requirement is applied, which consequently makes it
easier to avoid judicial review. As in PPA, the result is that employees
and outsiders cannot challenge the unconstitutional threat to freedom of
speech caused by a statute without risking severe civil penalties.163
1. The Interplay of Private and Government Action Restricting First
Amendment Rights
Restraints on free speech without direct government action may still
trigger the protections of the First Amendment rights.164 For example, in
NAACP v. Alabama, the Alabama Supreme Court held that a state statute
that required NAACP to disclose the names of its members was uncon-
stitutional.165 However, NAACP could not bring its constitutional chal-
lenge “until it purged itself of contempt by divulging its membership
158 PPA broadly applies to “any person who intentionally gains access to the nonpublic areas
of another’s premises and engages in an act that exceeds the person’s authority to enter those areas”
and imposes liability on the individual “to the owner or operator of the premises for any damages
sustained.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
159 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2.
160 See id.
161 See Bottemiller, supra note 17.
162 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat. Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979).
163 See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99A-2; see also PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369
(M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122 (4th Cir. 2018).
164 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958).
165 Id.
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lists.”166 Similarly, in PPA, the dismissal of the pre-enforcement chal-
lenge means that employees are required to violate PPA before the court
will hear their constitutional challenges.167 When state statutes permit
private actors to seek damages against an individual for expressing his or
her free-speech rights, there must be an immediate judicial recourse
against such unconstitutional chilling of free speech.
The U.S. Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama held that private
activity, like government action, can chill speech.168 The Court held that
the “interplay of governmental and private action” was sufficient to im-
plicate the First Amendment.169 Therefore, state laws that do not directly
restrain speech, but create the conditions by which private actors can
deter expressive conduct, may also fall within the scope of First Amend-
ment prohibitions.170 Private action chilling free speech, even without
government action, may satisfy the standing requirement.
2. Indirect Government Action Chilling Free Speech
When provisions of a state statute chill free speech, indirect govern-
ment action is at play regardless of whether the statute expressly permits
government action.171 In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney General of Vir-
ginia, the court held that a statute imposing civil penalties was unconsti-
tutional.172 The court found that the Mobil Oil Corporation suffered a
harm by self-censoring its actions.173 However, the district court in
PETA determined that this ruling did not apply to PPA.174 In Mobil Oil
Corp., the statute specifically gave the Attorney General the authority to
enforce the law and to investigate violations.175 The court in PETA held
that because the Attorney General was not expressly permitted by the
statute to enforce the law, PPA was a completely private action; there-
fore, the relaxed standing requirement did not apply.176 Yet, there was no
indication in Mobil Oil Corp. that an expressed enforcement provision
166 Id. at 454.
167 See PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2018).
168 NAACP, 357 U.S at 463.
169 Id.
170 See id.
171 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Att’y Gen. of Va. 940 F.2d 73, 77 (4th Cir. 1991).
172 Id. at 75.
173 Id. at 76.
174 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2018).
175 Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F.2d at 75.
176 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379-80 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x
122 (4th Cir. 2018).
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was required to apply the relaxed standing requirement.177 Here, North
Carolina’s enactment of PPA is the cause of the plaintiff’s (PETA) deci-
sion not to participate in the prohibited act. Even without the Attorney
General’s express ability to enforce PPA, indirect government action is
still at play and the relaxed standing requirement applies.
III. PPA AND ACT 606 ENCOURAGE THE ENACTMENT OF NEW
WHISTLEBLOWER SILENCING BILLS THAT INVADE THE
EMPLOYEE’S RIGHT TO UNCOVER WRONGDOING
Fourteen months after North Carolina implemented PPA, Arkansas
followed North Carolina’s civil approach with the 2017 enactment of Act
606.178 If this new design of civil ag-gag statutes is not struck down
under judicial review, then state legislatures will continue to draft ag-gag
laws that utilize this strategy and infringe on whistleblowers’ rights. In
June 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and re-
manded the district court decision, holding that the plaintiffs proved an
actual injury and thereby satisfied the standing requirement without re-
laxing the standard for First Amendment purposes.179 A new standard is
required to ensure that cases with certainly impending injuries are re-
viewable regardless of whether it is a criminal or civil case, and that the
standing requirement remains intact.
A. THE THREAT TO EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS IN ALL
WORKPLACES
Whistleblower-protection laws guarantee free speech to workers
willing to expose wrongdoing in the workplace.180 Although there are
federal and state laws that protect whistleblowers, the application of
those laws varies by state and by situation.181 There are various issues
that plague whistleblowers within different areas of the law. For instance,
in drafting the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Congress hoped to
address the rising issue of misuse of disclosure agreements to discourage
the reporting of illegal activities in the workplace.182 PPA and the new
177 Mobil Oil Corp., 940 F.2d at 76.
178 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
179 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 131
(4th Cir. 2018).
180 Occupational Safety and Health Admin, The Whistleblower Protection Program, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.whistleblowers.gov/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
181 Id.
182 Peter Menell, Misconstruing Whistleblower Immunity Under the Defend Trades Secrets
Act, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 3, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/01/03/misconstru
ing-whistleblower-immunity-under-the-defend-trade-secrets-act/.
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design of ag-gag legislation magnify the concern that whistleblower si-
lencing laws deter employees from uncovering wrongdoing.183 The si-
lencing of workplace whistleblowers will increase with an increase of
laws like PPA and Act 606.
An increased silencing of whistleblowers will have detrimental ef-
fects for the most vulnerable members of society. At age 90, Erytha
Mayberry’s daughters moved her to Quail Creek Nursing Home where
she suffered ongoing abuse and neglect by her two primary nursing-
home attendants.184 Erytha’s family attempted to discuss concerns with
the nursing home after finding bruises on Erytha’s arms and leg, but the
nursing home refused to take action.185 After Erytha told her daughters
that someone “was hurting her mouth,” her daughters placed hidden
cameras in her private room.186 The video captured disturbing footage of
two workers slapping Erytha in the face and stuffing her mouth with
latex gloves.187 The video also showed the workers forcibly pushing on
Erytha’s stomach, causing her to urinate so they would not have to
change her diaper again.188
Under PPA and Act 606, employees of Quail Creek Nursing Home
could be fined up to $5,000 a day for obtaining documents, recordings,
or videotapes of such abuse.189 Additionally, under Act 606, Erytha’s
daughters, who were nonemployees, could be found liable for damages
to Quail Creek Nursing Home for secretly videotaping Erytha’s private
room to investigate concerns for the wellbeing of their mother.190 Nurs-
ing homes are only one example of workplace settings where statutes
like PPA and Act 606 would apply.191 Childcare centers, restaurants, and
a variety of businesses could also target employees, and in some cases
nonemployees, for actions taken to expose wrongdoing in these
facilities.192
183 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
184 Racher v. Westlake Nursing Home Ltd. P’ship, 871 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (2017).




189 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
190 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113.
191 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-113. Act 606 provides an exception
for healthcare and medical providers; thus, nursing home employees who provide medical care may
be exempt under the statute.
192 Id.
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B. THE ROBERTS COURT: CONCERNS OF AN INCREASE IN
OVERREACHING STATUTES
The immediate action of the Roberts Court to address legislative
overreach is essential to prevent the continued drafting of whistleblower
silencing bills. “[T]he effect of many of the [Roberts] Court’s decisions
[is] to close the courthouse doors,”193 but the Roberts Court has in-
creased its review of standing cases compared to the Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts that preceded it.194 In some cases, the Court has pro-
vided a narrow interpretation of the standing doctrine, and in others, it
has provided a more relaxed standing requirement. One of the most note-
worthy standing cases that the Roberts Court has reviewed is Clapper v.
Amnesty International.195 In Clapper, the Court utilized the standing
doctrine to avoid constitutional review of the executive branch’s foreign
surveillance practices, ruling that the plaintiff did not prove that the in-
jury was “certainly impending.”196 Although the overall impact of the
Roberts Court’s decisions on substantive individual rights is unclear,
there are legitimate concerns that the decisions so far have not combatted
the concerns of an overreaching legislative body.
Through inaction, the Supreme Court has permitted other courts to
accept and dismiss the questionable conduct of state legislatures in enact-
ing speech-chilling statutes. However, courts are not required to go be-
yond acknowledging the problem. The Supreme Court needs to address a
clear solution to legislative overreach by broadening the application of
the standing doctrine to reduce state legislatures’ use of the doctrine as a
circumventive tool. Legislatures are challenging constitutional restric-
tions by using the PPA as the new vehicle to permit agricultural and
other powerful businesses to have extensive influence in their potentially
unethical practices, all while infringing on the First Amendment rights of
their employees.
193 Erwin Chemerinsky, Turning Sharply to the Right, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 423, 437
(2007), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3812&context=facpubs;
see Charles Whitebread, The Conservative Kennedy Court—What a Difference a Single Justice Can
Make: The 2006-2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
194 Lee Epstein et al., The Bush Imprint on the Supreme Court: Why Conservatives Should
Continue to Yearn and Liberals Should Not Fear, 43 TULSA L. REV. 651, 663 (2008), http://epstein
.wustl.edu/research/ChangeOrNot.pdf.
195 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S., 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013) (holding that the “speculative
chain of possibilities” did not establish a potential future injury that was certainly impending or
fairly traceable to the code).
196 See id. at 409-14.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Agricultural businesses and state legislatures, influenced by special
interests, aim to conceal the unethical practices existent within farm fac-
tories. The inhumane treatment of animals raised for food negatively im-
pacts the quality of the food supply and the safety of the workers within
the industry. The traditional ag-gag laws designed to prevent undercover
investigators from entering farm factories transformed into whistle-
blower silencing laws. These statutes threaten the whistleblowers’ right
to access workplace settings and expose workplace wrongdoing. Without
this access, vulnerable individuals who depend on undercover investiga-
tions to expose unethical behavior remain unprotected.
First Amendment free speech challenges “raise unique standing con-
siderations that tilt dramatically toward a finding of standing.”197 A rise
in statutes silencing workplace whistleblowers is expected because the
unpublished PETA v. Stein decision failed to address a certainly impend-
ing injury in its application of the standing requirement.198 Farm facto-
ries that struggled to pass legislation to protect their businesses from
whistleblowers succeeded with the enactment of PPA.199 The danger of
PPA is that any state may enact a statute that limits employees’ rights to
uncover wrongdoing. The application of the relaxed standing require-
ment to free-speech claims alleging certainly impending injuries is essen-
tial. Regardless of whether a statute is criminal or civil, and whether
direct government action is implicated, use of the relaxed standing re-
quirement will ensure that courts can address alleged infringements of
First Amendment rights. Inaction by the judicial branch will create a vast
threat to individual rights and a detachment from the objective of the
standing doctrine, which is intended to eliminate overreach—not em-
power it. Over 100 years later, state legislation threatens the same inves-
tigative methods that Upton Sinclair utilized to generate major reform in
the food industry.200 Today under PPA or Act 606, Sinclair’s seven-week
undercover investigation would expose Sinclair to $250,000 in fines.201
When a concerned whistleblower is menacingly silenced and prevented
from exposing wrongdoing within factories, nursing homes, and child-
care centers, the cost to society is devastating.
197 Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 235 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lopez v. Candaele, 630
F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2010)).
198 PETA, Inc. v. Stein, 259 F. Supp. 3d 369 (M.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 737 F. App’x 122, 131
(4th Cir. 2018).
199 ASPCA, supra note 8.
200 See Sinclair, supra note 1.
201 Upton Sinclair, BIOGRAPHY, https://www.biography.com/people/upton-sinclair-9484897
(last visited Mar. 3, 2019) (stating Sinclair spent several weeks investigating the meatpacking indus-
try). The author used a seven-week investigation to estimate $250,000 in fines at $5,000 a day.
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